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Klebanow by stating that the federal court must have "overlooked
the fact that the New York legislature has not so extended the
law as to limited partnerships." 106 The court reasoned that a
limited partnership is solely the creature of statute,1 7 having only
such rights, duties and obligations as the statutes and its contracts
may provide. 08 Therefore, since the legislature did not see fit to
endow a limited partner with the right to sue derivatively in the
name of the partnership, the court could not do so.1"" The court
thus strictly interpreted Section 115 of the New York Partnership
Law and therefore limited CPLR 1025, which permits a suit by or
against two or more partners in the partnership name.
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Rabin stated that if the majority
opinion was followed, there would then be no adequate remedy for
wrongs committed by the general partners against the partnership.
In urging that Klebanow be followed, he reasoned that a limited
partner would be unable to maintain an individual action because
of the difficulty of assessing and proving his personal loss. He
noted that even if the limited partner could prove his loss, the
remedy would remain inadequate since it was of greater interest to
the limited partner to see the partnership maintain a firm and
sound fiscal position. This greater interest, said Justice Rabin,
"could not be protected by relegating the limited partner to a suit
solely on his own behalf for his own specific damage." 110 He
insisted that if the majority view were followed, the general partners could "loot the partnership with impunity.. ..
111
"

ARTICLE 14-

ACTIONS BETWEEN JOINT TORT-FEASORS
Contribution between joint tort-feasors not apportioned on a strictly nuithematical basis.
In McCabe v. Century Theatres, Inc.,"1 12 the plaintiff was injured when she fell through open sidewalk doors leading to the
cellar of a store operated by Adolph Rohde, a subtenant of Queens
Park Operating Corporation. The building was owned by Grupenel
Realty Corporation. Grupenel and Queens Park, while contending
that together they should pay one-half of the judgment, nevertheless paid two-thirds of the amount in order to end the accrual of
interest. They then moved, pursuant to CPLR 1401, to recover,
CPLR 1401:

106 Millard v. Newimark & Co., 24 App. Div. 2d 333, 266 N.Y.S.2d 254
(1st Dep't 1966).
107 Lanier v. Bawdoin, 282 N.Y. 32, 38, 24 N.E.2d 732, 735 (1939).
losHerrick v. Gould, 257 App. Div. 341, 342-43, 13 N.Y.S.2d 115, 117
(1st
0 Dep't 1939).
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Supra note 106, at 337, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 259-60.
110 Id. at 342, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 264 (dissenting opinion).
II' Ibid.

112 25 App. Div. 2d 154, 268 N.Y.S.2d 48 (2d Dep't 1966).
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through contribution from Rohde's estate, the difference between
two-thirds and one-half of the judgment.
In reversing the special term and granting the motion, the
appellate division, second department, following the case of Wold
v. Grozalsky, 11 held that CPLR 1401 did not contemplate a
strictly mathematical computation of liability for payment between
joint tort-feasors.1 4 "Rather . . . the whole pattern of litigation
out of which the judgment was rendered is considered and the relative duties of the tort-feasors toward the injured party are assessed.
The process is essentially equitable and not mathematical." "5
The court stated that, for purposes of contribution, there were
two distinct causes (one active and one passive) of the plaintiff's
injuries, and, therefore, payment should be apportioned "not per
capita but per stirpes." 'l' The court consolidated the liability of
Grupenel and Queens Park as one such cause since both had failed
to perform identical duties arising from different sources, i.e., their
respective obligations as landlord and owner. In addition to this
similarity of duties, the court noted that Grupenel and Queens
Park were subsidiaries of the same parent, and were represented
by the same employees and by the same attorneys. "Their interests
and their positions were for all purposes the same. Except for
reasons of corporate convenience, either could have executed the
functions of the other." "
ARTICLE

31 -
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CPLR 3101(a): Disclosure extends to all relevant information
calculated to lead to relevant evidence.
Prior to Beyer v. Keller,""' in order for materials to be
they had
the subject of an order for discovery and inspection,
5
to be "evidence in chief," viz., admissible at trial." 9 Beyer, however, did away with this "evidence in chief" requirement.
With the adoption of Article 31 of the CPLR, it was felt that
pretrial discovery practices would be liberalized and that more
material would be made available to both parties. With the deci.13 277 N.Y. 364, 14 N.E.2d 437 (1939).
114 Id. at 366-67, 14 N.E.2d at 438.
-15 McCabe v. Century Theatres, Inc., 25 App. Div. 2d 154, 156, 268
N.Y.S.2d 48, 50 (2d Dep't 1966).
116 Supra note 115, at 158, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 52.

117 Ibid.
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App. Div. 2d 426, 207 N.Y.S2d 591 (1st Dep't 1960).

110 "Documents are not subject to inspection for the mere reason that

they will be useful in supplying a clue whereby evidence can be gathered.
Documents to be subject to inspection must be evidence themselves." People
ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 29, 156 N.E. 84, 85 (1927).
See also Peters v. Marquez, 21 Misc. 2d 720, 196 N.Y.S.2d 840 (Sup. Ct.
Westchester County 1959) and cases cited therein.

